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CLASS ACTIONS
By WILLIAM E. KELLY AND TIMOTHY C. KLENK*
IN THE PAST few years, the availability of class actions under rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has probably had a greater
effect on the administration of civil justice in the federal court system
than any other procedural device.' The growing number of cases
filed as class actions has added a tremendous burden to the already
over-worked district and appellate courts, but has also resulted in
the vindication of the rights of many small claimants who, absent
rule 23, would have been unable to obtain relief. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has been a leader in the de-
velopment of the law in this area.
* Partners in the firm of Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, and members of the
Illinois Bar. The authors were assisted in the preparation of this chapter by Mark T.
Dunn and Patricia A. Brandin.
1. Rule 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class.
Rule 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and na-
ture of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
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The work of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the
class action area during its 1973-1974 term has perhaps been over-
shadowed by several important class action decisions handed down by
the United States Supreme Court during the same period.2 However,
the Seventh Circuit decisions during this term will have a substantial
impact on class action procedures in this circuit and in others and their
importance can hardly be overemphasized. Among the important
areas of the law relating to class actions discussed in these cases are:
1) the jurisdiction of federal courts in class actions; 2) notice to class
members; 3) the prerequisites for maintaining class actions; 4) dis-
covery against class members; and 5) the appealability of the allowance
or denial of class action status. The effect of the recent decisions of
the Seventh Circuit on these areas of class action law will be discussed
in this article.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
A question which has repeatedly been presented in class action
cases is whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over the claims of
class members in cases where those class members could not have indi-
vidually asserted their claims because of a lack of federal court juris-
diction. This question was presented to the Supreme Court of the
United States in the well-known case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble.3 In that case the Court held that a group of Indiana citizens
were bound by an earlier decree in a case in which they were members
of the plaintiff class---despite the fact that the court's jurisdiction in that
case was based on diversity of citizenship and the defendant was an
Indiana citizen.4 In Snyder v. Harris5 the Court decided that a class
action in a diversity case could not be maintained by a named plaintiff
who alleged damages of less than $10,000, even though the aggregate
amount of the claims of the plaintiff and other class members far ex-
ceeded that jurisdictional amount. However, the Court did not decide
whether a plaintiff who had a claim of $10,000 or more could bring
an action on behalf of class members whose individual claims did not
meet that jurisdictional amount. This question was decided by the
Court in December of 1973 in Zahn v. International Paper Co.6 The
2. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974);
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
3. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
4. Id. at 365-66.
5. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
6. 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
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Court, concluding that Snyder v. Harris demanded the application of
"the rule governing named plaintiffs joining in an action to the un-
named members of a class,"'7 held that the claims of the class members
could not be aggregated to establish the $10,000 amount in contro-
versy, but that each class member had to be able to establish federal
court jurisdiction over his own claim. As stated by the Court, "one
plaintiff may not ride on another's coattails."8
The question of the jurisdiction of federal courts in class actions
came before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during its
most recent term in a unique way. In Appleton Electric Co. v.
Advance-United Expressways,9 the plaintiff, on behalf of a class of
shippers, brought an action against defendant, as representative of a
class of trucking companies, for the refund of excessive rates which the
defendants had charged to them. Counsel for the defendant class ob-
jected to the inclusion in the class of any defendants who had no "mini-
mal contacts" with the northern district of Illinois, arguing that the
court had neither jurisdiction over them nor venue over the claims
against them. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that section
16(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act'0 specifically provides that suits
under section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act, under which the
shippers were suing, may be maintained against joint defendants in any
district in which any one of said joint defendants could have been
sued."
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zahn, treating absent
class members the same as named plaintiffs for jurisdictional purposes,
the court was probably fully justified in applying section 16(4) of the
Interstate Commerce Act in the class action before it. Furthermore,
although the court in Appleton Electric did not specifically deal with
the question of the constitutionality of section 16(4), there is probably
little question that it at least marginally comes within due process stand-
7. 94 S. Ct. at 512, n.9.
8. Id. at 512. The Court's conclusion that unnamed class members must be
treated the same as named plaintiffs is not only consistent with Snyder v. Harris, but
would seem necessary in view of rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that those rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the United States District Courts .... ." However, as pointed out by the dissenting Jus-
tices in Zahn, the decision appears to be inconsistent with the Court's decision in Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Unfortunately, the majority
opinion does not even mention the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur case, no less distinguish
or overrule it.
9. 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
10. 49 U.S.C. §16(4) (1970).
Il. 494 F.2d at 139,
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ards. As stated by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Labor Board,"2
"Congress clearly has the power to authorize a suit under federal law
to be brought in any inferior federal court. Congress has power, like-
wise, to provide that the process of every district court shall run into
every part of the United States."' 3
Unfortunately, rather than limiting its decision to the facts in the
case -before it, the court of appeals went on to state: "Even if this were
not a suit under section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act, Rule 23
must be interpreted to allow inclusion of all class members, whatever
their connection with the forum."' 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted from Research Corp.
v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 5 in which the district court held
that an action could be maintained against absent members of a de-
fendant class, even though the court lacked venue with respect to the
claims against them. In support of its determination, the court asserted
that defendant class actions would virtually be eliminated if courts
apply the same venue requirements to absent members of defendant
classes as are applied to named defendants. It said:
The Supreme Court has ruled, albeit not in a class action
situation, that the patent venue statute is exclusive and must be
satisfied as to all defendants. . . . The Supreme Court has also
ruled that with regard to the aggregation of separate claims in a
class action under Rule 23, Rule 82 forbids the expansion of the
term 'matter in controversy' to allow the aggregation of the claims
in such suits to reach the jurisdictional amount. . . . The de-
fendants argue that since Rule 82 also says that the federal rules
'shall not be construed to extend or limit' the venue of actions, as
well as jurisdiction, the valid venue objections of the nonparty
class members should also be sustained. However, this court
concludes that venue need not be established as to those non-
representative-party class members, since to do so would eliminate
the use of the class action route in all cases where a defendant
class is appropriate.' 6
It appears that the district court decision in the Research Corp.
case was not justified and thus the Seventh Circuit's reliance on that
decision in Appleton Electric was unwarranted. Despite the under-
standable desire of the district court in Research Corp. to make defend-
ant class actions as effective as possible, and to effectuate the purpose
of rule 23 in this regard, it had no power to interpret rule 23 in any
12. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
13. Id. at 622.
14. 494 F.2d at 140.
15. 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. IMi. 1969).
16. !d. at 501 (citations omitted).
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way which would extend the court's jurisdiction or venue. Not only
is it prevented from doing so by rule 82, which precludes the construc-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in any way which would
"extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or
the venue of actions therein," but it is precluded from doing so because
any interpretation of the rules of procedure in a way which would give
the district courts jurisdiction or venue over defendants in a class ac-
tion which it would not have had if those defendants were named de-
fendants in the action would violate the separation of powers concept
contemplated by the enabling Act pursuant to which the Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated. 17  This is especially true in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co.' 8
indicating that, at least for jurisdictional purposes, class members must
be treated the same as named parties.' 9
The Seventh Circuit in Appleton Electric, again citing the Re-
search Corp. case, also states that, the right of defendant class members
to exclude themselves from the defendant class "is adequate protection
for whatever due process rights are not satisfied by actual notice and
representation by the unnamed defendants."20  However, the court's
statement is made with respect to its discussion of the adequacy of
representation question and should not be construed to apply to ques-
tions of jurisdiction or venue. Certainly, a court which lacks jurisdic-
tion over the person of certain defendants cannot obtain such jurisdic-
tion by affording those defendants the opportunity to remove them-
17. The Enabling Act, pursuant to which Congress gave the Supreme Court the
authority to promulgate rules of procedure, requires that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). In promulgating
the rules, the Court specifically provided in rule 82 that the rules should not be con-
strued to effect jurisdiction or venue. The jurisdiction and venue of federal courts is,
of course, controlled by article II of the Constitution and by statute. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1251 (1970), et seq.
18. 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
19. See discussion following note 5, supra. One interesting aspect of the Zahn
decision is that the majority consistently refers to class members as plaintiffs, whereas,
the dissenting justices just as consistently refer to them as "nonappearing members of
the class." See also American Pipe & Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 94 S. Ct. 756
(1974), in which the Court held that the statute of limitations with respect to the claims
of the class members was tolled between the date on which the class action complaint
was filed and the date on which the district court found that the case could not properly
be maintained as a class action. The Court said:
Under the circumstances of the case, where the District Court found that the
named plaintiffs asserted claims that were 'typical of the claims or defenses
of the class' and would 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,'
Rule 23(a)(3), (4), the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the
suit until and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue,
Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
20. 494 F.2d at 140,
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selves from the case. Although a named defendant can waive in
personam jurisdiction by appearing in an action, his failure to opt out
can hardly be equated to making such an appearance.
NOTICE
After disposing of the jurisdictional question in Appleton Electric,
the court noted that each member of the defendant class would receive
notice of the suit by certified mail.2 ' It then concluded that "the only
possible constitutional infirmity is inadequate representation." With
respect to the question of adequacy of representation, the court found
that the only conflict between the interests of the named defendant and
the other class members would be in apportioning the refunds they
would have to pay to the plaintiffs.22 The court then observed that
any class member who felt it would not be adequately represented by
the named defendant could opt out, and held that "It]he opportunity
for exclusion is adequate protection for whatever due process rights are
not satisfied by actual notice and representation by the named defend-
ant or by counsel for unnamed defendants."2
One month before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
handed down its decision in Appleton Electric, it decided another case
involving the question of notice to the class and the right of class mem-
bers to opt out after receiving such notice if they did not believe that
they were adequately represented. In that case, Air Line Stewards
& Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines,24 a union which
represented airline stewardesses, and twelve stewardesses who lost
their jobs after becoming pregnant, sued on behalf of a class of all
stewardesses employed by American Airlines "who had been, desired
to be, or would in the future desire to be, pregnant."25  The suit chal-
lenged American's policy of terminating pregnant stewardesses as be-
ing discriminatory against women, and thus violating the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.28 Shortly after the union and the stewardesses filed their
class action complaint, the union and American Airlines entered into




24. 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 637-38. The appeal in this case was consolidated with the appeal in Air-
line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., a case against
TWA involving the same issues. For simplicity's sake, the discussion herein will be lim-
ited to the case against American Airlines.
26. 92 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1970).
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terminated prospectively. The union and American then negotiated
a settlement of the class action. Under the terms of the settlement,
stewardesses who had been discharged because of their pregnancy
would be rehired as vacancies occurred, but they would not be entitled
to back pay.
The district court gave notice of the settlement to the class of
terminated stewardesses. Several of the class members registered
their opposition to it and sought to remove themselves from the class.
The district court held that the action was a rule 23 (b) (2) class action
and that class members were thus not entitled to exclude themselves.
Therefore, it entered judgment approving the settlement and ordering
it implemented. Several of the objecting class members appealed.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that, because of the
collective bargaining agreement reached by the union and American,
there was no longer any need for the prospective relief sought on be-
half of stewardesses who had not yet been terminated. The only class
needing relief after that agreement was reached was the class of former
stewardesses whose employment had been terminated because of their
pregnancy. As to that class, the court held, the action must be main-
tained as a 23(b)(3) class action, notice of the action must be given
to all class members, and each must be given the opportunity to opt
out of the class. "Unless a class action is maintained under rule 23
(b) (3)," the court concluded "no right to opt out exists. 27
The court's determination in Appleton Electric, that the right to
opt out of a class provides adequate protection for whatever due proc-
ess rights are not satisfied by actual notice and representation by the
named defendant or by counsel for the unnamed defendants, and its
conclusion in the Airline Stewards & Stewardesses case that the right
to opt out exists only in rule 23(b)(3) class actions, raises the question
of whether due process requires notice to class members in rule 23(b)
(1) and (2) class actions. Without such notice, class members would
not only be unable to exclude themselves from the class, but would
be unable to intervene, to have counsel of their own choice appear on
their behalf, or to challenge the adequacy of their representation.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,28 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, stated that "notice is required as a matter of due plroc-
ess in all representative class actions, and [rule] 23(c) (2) merely re-
27. 490 F.2d at 642.
28. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Eisen 11].
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quires a particularized form of notice in [rule] 23(b) (3) actions."29
In Schrader v. Selective Service System, 3° the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's conclusion, holding: "we
are of the opinion that the Eisen . . . decision is the correct interpreta-
tion of Rule 23 (b) (1) and (2). The more recent District Court opin-
ions agree that pre-judgment notice is required in all representative ac-
tions.""1  Thus, the court in Schrader held that the district court in a
previous class action, in which Schrader was a class member, "had
erred in not requiring notice to be given in some manner to absent class
members," and that that case "was not a valid class action and was not
binding upon anyone except the named plaintiffs to that action." 2
The question of whether due process requires notice above and
beyond the explicit directives of rule 23 has yet to be decided by the
Supreme Court, and the circuits are almost evenly divided on the ques-
tion."3 The issue was presented to the Supreme Court in the recent
29. Id. at 564.
30. 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972).
31. Id., citing Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd
441 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971) and Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 52 F.R.D.
532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit referred
to the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit in Eisen II as holding, it is at least
arguable that it was only dictum, because Eisen 11 involved a rule 23(b) (3) class action,
for which notice is, in any event, required by rule 23 (c) (2).
32. 470 F.2d at 75. The court of appeals did not discuss its reason for holding
that the defendant was not bound by the previous decision because the plaintiff had not
received notice. Presumably, it based its conclusion in this regard on a mutuality of
estoppel theory. The context in which the question of the res judicata effect of a pro-
ceeding in which there was some constitutional deficiency will probably arise most often
where a plaintiff seeks to maintain an action, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff is
bound by the judgment in a former action in which the plaintiff was a class member,
and the plaintiff collaterally attacks the former judgment because of some procedural
deficiency in it. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), in which
the court held a plaintiff not bound by the judgment in a former class action because
the plaintiff did not adequately represent the class. See also, Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), in which the plaintiff in a subsequent action unsuc-
cessfully argued that the court in the original class action lacked jurisdiction over certain
class members.
33. A. Notice is required in all class actions:
Second Circuit. Eisen v. Jacquelin, 391 F.2d (2d Cir. 1968); Brandt v. Owens-
Illinois Inc., 62 F.R.D. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99, 109 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486
(W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972); Fowles v. American Export Lines, Inc.,
300 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Fifth Circuit. Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd,
444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305,
1306 (E.D. La. 1969).
Sixth Circuit. Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1972).
Seventh Circuit. King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 96, 100
(N.D. Ill. 1972), appeal dismissed, 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973); Shane v. Northwest
Industries, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 46, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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appeal from the Second Circuit's decisions in Eisen but the Court noted
that the case before it was a (b)(3) class action and that rule 23(c)
(2) expressly required that notice be given in such actions. 4 Thus,
it declined to rule on the broader due process question. 5
In reaching the conclusion that notice to the class was required
in all class actions, the Eisen 1136 court relied on Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.87  However, this reliance may have been
misplaced since Mullane was not a representative action, but a suit
to settle a common trust fund where a large number of beneficiaries
were interested parties. Thus, the court was not concerned with ques-
tions of notice where an adequate representative of the class was pres-
ent, but with what type of notice was required to preserve the parties'
due process rights.
Although the Supreme Court in Eisen IV claimed to be "con-
cerned . .. only with the notice requirements of subdivision (c)(2),
which are applicable to class actions maintained under subdivision (b)
(3), ' 38 it also cited the Mullane case in a way which lends support to
those arguing that due process requires notice to the class in all class
actions. The Court in Eisen IV said:
In Mullane the Court addressed the constitutional sufficiency of
publication notice rather than mailed individual notice to known
beneficiaries of a common trust fund as part of a judicial settlement
of accounts. The Court observed that notice and an opportunity
to be heard were fundamental requisites of the constitutional guar-
antee of procedural due process. It further stated that notice must
be 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
B. Notice is not required by due process in every class action:
First Circuit. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1053, 1055 (lst Cir. 1972).
Second Circuit. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D.
Conn. 1973); Wilcynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 512 n.3 (D. Conn. 1971); Solo-
mon v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409, 411 n.1 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
D.C. Circuit. Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980 n.10 (D.D.C. 1972),
affd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Fourth Circuit. Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972);
Vaughs v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, 355 F. Supp. 1034, 1035 n.1
(D. Md. 1972).
Fifth Circuit. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125
(5th Cir. 1969); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Co., 350 F. Supp. 139, 141 (S.D.
Ga. 1972), alf'd, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974).
Tenth Circuit. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D.
Kan. 1968), modified on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 951 (1972).
34. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 n.14 (1974) (Eisen IV).
35. Id.
36. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
37. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
38. 94 S. Ct. at 2152 n.14.
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interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.'39
Although the language cited by the Court from Mullane is broad,
it must be read in the context of the Court's refusal to decide whether
due process requires notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. It
must also be remembered that the language is cited by the Court in
support of its holding that "[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class
members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through rea-
sonable effort, ' 40 and thus deals with the question of the type of notice
which must be given where notice is required, rather than with the
question of whether such notice is required in cases where the absent
class member is adequately represented.
41
The reliance on adequate representation to satisfy the dictates of
due process finds some support in two older Supreme Court cases. In
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,4 a diversity case decided under
former Supreme Court Rule 38, the Court held that a class decree was
res judicata as to all members of the class despite the fact that some
of them resided in the same state as the defendant. The court based
its holding on the fact that the claims of the absent members had been
fully and adequately represented and made no mention of any notice
requirement.
Similarly in the later case of Hansberry v. Lee,43 the Supreme Court
considered the question of whether a prior suit designated as a class
action was res judicata as to the claims of absent class members. Again
the Court made no mention of any notice requirement. The Court in-
stead focused on the issue of adequacy of representation, stating that
members of a class, though not present, may be bound by the judgment
where they are adequately represented by parties who are present.44
39. ld. at 2151 (emphasis added).
40. ld.
41. Even Mullane, which was not a representative action, recognizes that, under
some circumstances, persons who cannot be given notice can fairly be bound by the de-
termination reached in a suit in which their interests are adequately represented. In dis-
cussing the type of notice to the trust beneficiaries which would be adequate to assure
due process in that case, the Court observed:
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The individ-
ual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The
rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are
shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore, notice reasonably certain to
reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests
of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all.
42. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
43. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
44. Id. at 42-43.
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Due process requirements are met unless "it cannot be said that the
procedure adopted fairly insures the protection of absent parties who
are bound by it."4
In order to determine whether adequate representation alone,
without notice, is sufficient to "fairly insure the protection of the in-
terests of absent parties" who might be bound by the judgment in a
class action, it is helpful to analyze the function that notice would serve
in the different types of class actions permitted by rule 23.
In actions under rule 23 (b) (1),46 it is apparent that whatever re-
lief is granted will affect all class members in the same way, and that
the only individual issues would relate to the specific amount of
money or property, if any is involved, to which each member would
be entitled. In this type of case, there is only one possible class solu-
tion to the dispute, so it would make no sense to allow class members
to opt out. Furthermore, if representation is indeed adequate, the
position of all class members would be presented, since their claims
or defenses are identical to those of the class representative. The only
benefit of prejudgment notice would be to give class members the
opportunity to make a personal judgment as to the adequacy of rep-
resentation and intervene if they so desire.
Actions filed under rule 23(b)(2)4 7 also involve situations where
class members stand in identical positions with respect to the opposing
45. Id. at 42.
46. Rule 23(b)(1) provides that class actions can be maintained where the prose-
cution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create
a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests.
Examples of such actions given by the Advisory Committee include, under (A), litiga-
tion to declare a bond issue invalid, to compel or invalidate an assessment, or to deter-
mine rights or duties of riparian owners. Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69,
100 (1966). Under (B), the examples given include an action to prevent financial re-
organization of a fraternal benefit association, an action by shareholders to compel the
declaration of dividends, or a claim against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. Id.
at 100-02 (1966).
47. Rule 23(b) (2) provides that class actions can be maintained where "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory re-
lief with respect to the class as a whole." Examples of (b) (2) actions listed in the Ad-
visory Committee Notes include civil rights actions alleging class-wide discrimination
and suits by a group of purchasers against a seller to enjoin illegal price discrimination.
Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
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party and where the relief granted would affect the class in an identi-
cal manner. In such cases, it makes little sense to allow a class mem-
ber to opt out, since, as a practical matter, the decree will be disposi-
tive of the claims of the class in any event. Although rule 23(b)(2)
can be applied only in cases where "injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief" is requested, it has been applied in cases where a
claim for such relief is accompanied by an "ancillary" claim for dam-
ages."' In addition, some (b) (2) classes might include sub-classes
which could be entitled to relief which is different than that sought by
other class members. 9 In such cases, due process may require not
only that each sub-class be adequately represented, but that each class
member be given notice of the action and the opportunity to withdraw.
One answer to this problem lies not so much in providing individ-
ual notice in all (b)(2) actions, but in correctly identifying the type
of class which is involved. The Seventh Circuit, in Air Line Stewards
& Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines, Inc.,50 made the dis-
tinction between (b) (2) and (b) (3) actions clear in a case in which
the class (which had been held by the district court to be a (b) (2)
class) included both discharged and currently employed stewardesses.
As to the sub-class of currently employed stewardesses, the court noted
that the only relief they sought from American's practice of discharging
pregnant stewardesses was prospective. Thus, a (b)(2) class was
appropriate as to them." But, as to those stewardesses who had al-
ready been discharged because of American's discriminatory policy, the
court of appeals found the district court's (b)(2) class designation er-
roneous. Because the right to reinstatement and/or back pay of each
of the discharged stewardesses depended on facts peculiar to each indi-
vidual, a (b) (3) action was found to be the only appropriate one with
48. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation, 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); and Alexander v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666, 676 (N.D. Ill.
1972). Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply where "the appropriate final relief relates . . .
predominantly to money damages." Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102
(1966); Landau v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 367 F. Supp. 992, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (1969); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc.
v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 29 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. See, e.g., Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), where the plaintiff class included both dis-
charged stewardesses, who were interested in re-instatement and back pay, and steward-
esses who were still employed, who were interested only in prospective relief.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 643. However, the claims of this (b)(2) class were moot, because the
stewardesses and the airline had entered a collective bargaining agreement in which the
stewardesses received the relief they sought.
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respect to their claims.52
Reclassification of an action is not the only alternative to an across-
the-board due process requirement of giving notice in all class actions.
A number of courts have recognized, 53 and indeed rule 23 itself pro-
vides, that notice may be given in any class action where it is necessary
for "the fair conduct of the action."54  In fact, even in the Second Cir-
cuit, at least one district court has interpreted the language of Eisen
II in a more restricted manner than did the Seventh Circuit in Schrader.
In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 5 the plaintiff class sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against Connecticut's garnishment law.
The court found that this was a proper class action under rule 23(b)
(2) and that no notice to class members was required by due process
since the plaintiffs were adequately represented, no monetary relief
was requested and no factual issues were presented. The court noted
the Eisen II dicta, but concluded: "[W]e read Eisen simply to say that
notice is required in all class actions when due process so requires."5 6
Under rule 23(d)(2), district courts have the discretion to order
notice in any class action. In exercising this discretion, the district
courts should take into consideration the common or individual nature
of the claims or defenses of the class members and the ability of the
class representative to represent the class members with respect to
those claims or defenses. Although this more flexible approach would
lack the degree of certainty afforded by the Schrader decision, it would
seem to offer protection to absent class members while still preserving
the utility of the class action device.
PREREQUISITES
Subsection (a) of rule 23 sets forth several requirements, all of
which must be met by a party seeking to maintain a class action in
federal court.5 7  Subsection (b) describes three types of class actions
and sets forth the requirements which must be met by a party seeking
to maintain a class action under each. The most frequent question pre-
52. Id. at 643.
53. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D.
Conn. 1973); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980 n.10 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd,
486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp.
619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), modified on other grounds, 411 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972).
54. Rule 23(d)(2).
55. 360 F. Supp. 1720 (D. Conn. 1973).
56. Id. at 722 n.3.
57. See note 1 supra.
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sented to the federal courts dealing with class actions is whether these
requirements (or "prerequisites") have been met. Although "Rule 23
obviously vests the trial judge with wide discretion in his application
of [these prerequisites],"55 questions involving their application are
often presented on appeal. Several of the cases decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during the past year deal with the
prerequisites established by rule 23(a) and (b) for maintaining class
actions. Two of the prerequisites for class actions which have been
litigated in the Seventh Circuit are the "adequacy of representation"5
and "manageability '"6 requirements.
Adequacy of Representation
One of the most important prerequisites for maintaining a class
action under rule 23 is that the representative party fairly and ade-
quately represent the interests of the absent class members. The im-
portance of this issue stems from the fact that adequacy of representa-
tion is mandated not only by rule 23, but by the due process clause
of the Constitution.61 One criteria which has been repeatedly applied
by the courts in determining adequacy of representation is whether the
interests of the representative party are co-extensive with the interests
of the class, or whether those interests conflict with the interests of the
absent class members.62 Another criteria, which is closely related to
the first, is whether the representative party is a member of the class
he purports to represent. 63
The first of these two criteria was considered by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in the previously discussed case of Air Line Stewards & Steward-
esses Association v. American Airlines.64 In that case, a union which
was authorized to represent the stewardesses in their collective bargain-
ing with the airline with respect to the terms of the employment, sought
to represent both present and terminated stewardesses in the class ac-
tion. The court held that the union's "adequacy as a representative




61. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12,
24 (2d Cir. 1971).
63. See, e.g., LaMar v. H & B Novelty Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973)
and Mintz v. Mathers Fund, 463 F.2d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1972). Cf. Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
64. 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
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party in a class suit, and its authority to compromise the rights of its
members in a class suit when such rights do not arise out of collective
bargaining agreements are to be tested and judged in the ordinary
way." 65  Applying these "ordinary" criteria, the court found that the
union was not an adequate representative of the class and, in fact, had
interests antagonistic to those of the class. 66 Of particular concern to
the court was the fact that the union's interest in protecting the jobs
of recently employed stewardesses conflicted with the interest of ter-
minated stewardesses who, if reinstated, might replace them.
7
Of utmost importance in determining whether a representative
party has interests which coincide with those of the absent class mem-
bers, and will thus adequately represent the class, is the question of
whether the representative possesses the same claims or defenses as
the class he purports to represent. As stated by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc.: 6
A plaintiff who is unable to secure standing for himself is certainly
not in a position to 'fairly insure the adequate representation' of
those alleged to be similarly situated. In short, a predicate to a
party's right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own
right. What he may not achieve himself, he may not accomplish as
a representative of a class. 69
The requirement that the plaintiff have the same claim or defense as
the other class members is required not only by the adequacy of rep-
resentation requirement of rule 23(a)(4), but by the case or contro-
versy requirement of article III of the Constitution, 70 by the language
of rule 23(a) that "one or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties,"' 71 and by the requirement that the claims
65. Id. at 642, citing Cook County College Teachers Union v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882,
885 (7th Cir. 1972), and other cases.
66. 490 F.2d at 640.
67. Id. at 639-40.
68. 463 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 499. See also LaMar v. H & B Novelty Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.
1973); and Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 259, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
70. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974), the Court was faced with the
question of whether certain citizens of Cairo, Illinois, could assert a claim against a
county judge and magistrate based on their alleged discrimination in setting bail for, and
sentencing, criminal defendants. The Court said: "[I]f none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class." Id. at 677. See also Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234,
1236-37 (7th Cir. 1969).
71. Rule 23(a) (emphasis added). See Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 259,
261 (E.D. Pa. 1972) in which the court said:
Certainly membership in the class by a party who seeks to represent it is a
fundamental prerequisite to a class action. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31,
32-33? 82 5. Ct. 549? 7 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1962). To be a member of a class,
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of the representative party be typical of those of the class. 2
In the Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Association case, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the union could not "be treated as the
equivalent of a group of former stewardesses terminated on account
of pregnancy, and thus members of and adequate representative of, the
class." Therefore, the leaders of the union "are not members of the
class as now defined, and they have antagonistic interests.""3
One problem raised by the rule that a class representative must
be a member of the class he purports to represent is when and how
the determination of whether he has the same claim or defense as the
absent class members should be made. This question is especially dif-
ficult when the determination depends on contested issues of fact or
law.
In Eisen IV, 74 one of the issues presented to the Supreme Court
was whether it had been proper for the district court to conduct a
"mini-hearing" on the merits of the plaintiff's claim for the purpose of
determining whether the plaintiff or defendant would have to pay for
notice to the class. In holding that such a hearing was improper, the
Court said:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into
the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be main-
tained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the
Rule by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits
of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it.75
The difficulty with the Supreme Court's position in Eisen IV is
that it ignores the fact that the answer to the question of whether the
requirements of rule 23 are met often depends on whether the plain-
tiff has stated a cause of action and can prevail on it, or whether his
claim might be barred by some defense which does not relate to the
class as a whole. One way in which this difficulty can be avoided is
suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Koos v. First Nat'l Bank of Pe-
oria.76
a party must have rights in the cause of action asserted on behalf of the class,
i.e., he must have suffered or be threatened with the same injury alleged on
behalf of the class. See Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. Rule 23(a)(3).
73. Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636, 640 (7th Cir. 1973).
74. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
75. Id. at 2152.
76. 496 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1974). This case was decided a few days before the
Supreme Court's Eisen IV decision.
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In Koos, the plaintiff filed an action on his own behalf and on
behalf of other borrowers from the defendant bank alleging that the
defendant was charging them in excess of the 8 per cent rate of interest
allowed by the Illinois Usury Law. 77 The plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendants' use of a 360-day year to calculate interest caused the annual
rate to exceed eight per cent.78  The statute under which the plaintiff
sued specifically exempted from the eight per cent maximum interest
rate loans secured by certain securities, including stock certificates and
certificates of deposit. The loan which had been made to the plaintiff
by the defendant bank had been secured by the pledge of four savings
and loan certificates for the withdrawal of capital accounts and by the
assignment of a cash value of two life insurance policies. The district
court held that the statute was "designed to protect only relatively
small, personal, non-business borrowers from high interest rates," and
that "while the collateral in the present case may not exactly be the
ordinary certificates of deposit in all respects and in a purely technical
sense, any variance is not significant in view of the apparent purpose
of the statute."7 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's con-
clusion as to the purpose of the exception contained in the Illinois
Usury Law and the application of that exception to the loan to the
named plaintiff.
Both the district court and the court of appeals in the Koos case
found that, because the plaintiff himself had no claim against the
defendant, he was an inadequate representative of the class of borrow-
ers who might have had such a claim. However, the district court
added to its rationale by indicating that the plaintiff's claims would be
atypical of those of the class even if they were only "possibly excepted"
from the usury provisions of the Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit ap-
proved this rationale, stating: "Where it is predictable that a major focus
of the litigation will be on an arguable defense unique to the named
plaintiff or a small subclass, then the named plaintiff is not a proper
class representative."8 " The court reasoned that this situation could re-
sult in "less attention to the issue which would be controlling for the
rest of the class."'
The court's opinion in Koos suggests that there are two methods
77. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 74, §4 (1972).
78. The issue of the propriety of a class action in a similar case involving the same
issue of the legality of using a 360-day year for computing interest in Illinois is, at the
time this article is being written, pending before the Illinois Supreme Court in Perlman
v. First National Bank of Chicago, I1l. S. Ct. Docket No. 46531.
79. Koos v. First National Bank of Peoria, 358 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D. Ill. 1973).
80. Koos v. First National Bank of Peoria, 496 F.2d 1162, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 1165.
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by which the adequacy of the plaintiff's representation of a class might
be determined where defenses exist with respect to his claim which
might not exist with respect to the claims of other class members.
First, the courts could decide whether or not the plaintiff will prevail
on the individual issue, as both the district court and court of appeals
did in Koos. If the court determines that the plaintiff will not prevail
on that issue, he cannot adequately represent the class. If the court
determines that he will prevail on that issue, he will be an adequate
representative of the class. The second approach would be to deny
class action status where an issue has been raised with respect to the
plaintiff which does not apply to most class members, especially where
that issue could constitute "a major focus of the litigation.""2
The second approach is probably the most consistent with Eisen
IV, since it does not require, as does the first approach, a determina-
tion of the merits of the representative party claim. Nor does it re-
quire a preliminary hearing with respect to the representative's claim
which might otherwise be necessary to determine whether or not that
representative is a member of the class and can adequately protect
its interests. s
Manageability
Perhaps the requirement which has been at issue in more class
action cases than any other is the "manageability" requirement which
applies in 23(b)(3) class actions.84 This issue was discussed by the
Seventh Circuit in some detail in Appleton Electric.85 The court
pointed out that the nature of the case (a suit for the refund of shipping
charges) made it more manageable than many other cases, that the
agreement of the plaintiffs to pay the cost of notice to the class avoided
the question that was then pending before the Supreme Court in the
Eisen IV case,86 and that the district court had applied none of the
82. Id. at 1164.
83. This approach has been applied not only by the Seventh Circuit in Koos, and
in Muller v. Curtis Publishing Co., .57 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1973), cited by the court
in Koos, 496 F.2d at 1164, but in the recent decision of the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware in Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. The Outboard Marine Corp.,
Civ. Act. No. 4453, ATRR, No. 679, p. A-19 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 1974).
84. One of the factors to be considered in determining whether a class action is
"superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy," is "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."
Rule 23(b) (3) (D).
85. Appleton Electric v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1974).
86. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S, Ct. 2140 (1974).
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creative innovations such as the "mini-hearing," "selective notice" and
"fluid recovery" which the district court had applied in the Eisen
case. 7  The court then added that the courts in the Seventh Circuit
"have traditionally been tolerant of the manageability of multi-party
litigation."88  In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec-
tronics, Inc.,89 the court said: [t]he difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action are not important when
weighed against the benefits to the class, and any subclasses thereof,
and to the administration of justice." And in Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc.,9 ° the court said: "Even though the class actions may
expand administrative tasks, the benefits to be secured will more than
outweigh the additional chores."
In contrast to the liberal view taken by the Seventh Circuit toward
class actions which present substantial problems of manageability, it
seems that the courts in several other circuits are re-assessing the abil-
ity of the federal court system to cope with those problems. For ex-
ample, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 111)91 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the problem of vindicat-
ing the small claims of large numbers of class members was "for solu-
tion by the Congress" and could probably not even be remedied by
further amendments to rule 23. In Hackett v. General Host Corp.,92
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also emphasized the burden
which complex class actions are imposing on the federal court system.
In support of its statement that the district courts in the Seventh
Circuit "have traditionally been tolerant of the manageability of multi-
87. 499 F.2d at 135-37.
88. 494 F.2d at 138.
89. 285 F. Supp. 714, 724-25 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
90. 301 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Contra, Bosches v. General Motors
Corporation, 59 F.R.D. 589, 601 (N.D. Ill. 1973):
It may be that denial of the class may effectively foreclose the opportunity of
GM purchasers to come into court and prove any damages they have sustained.
However, Rule 23 does not require or contemplate that courts will hear causes
of action merely because they will not get to hear the case any other way.
91. 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973). But see the dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) in Eisen IV: "The class action is
one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command the
status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view of creating a system of law that
dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed with power and
wealth." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2156-57 (1974). The majority
of the justices in Eisen IV refused to deal with the question of the manageability of the
action before the Court, stating that they "found the notice requirements of Rule 23 to
be dispositive of petitioner's attempt to maintain the class action . .." and thus had "no
occasion to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issues of man-
ageability and fluid class recovery." Id. at 2150 n.10.
92. 455 F.2d 618, 625-26 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
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party litigation," the court of appeals in Appleton Electric quotes
sweeping language from two decisions of the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois regarding the benefits of class actions out-
weighing the difficulties in their management.93 These quotes should
not be construed to 'be a statement that the benefits of class actions
will outweigh the problems raised in managing them in all cases. Rule
23(b)(3)(D) necessitates an inquiry into the manageability of the ac-
tion and, although the court has indicated its intention to liberally apply
the manageability requirement, that requirement cannot be ignored.
One aspect of manageability with which the court dealt in Apple-
ton Electric was the difficulty in determining the identity of the mem-
bers of the plaintiff class. The court pointed out that the reason for
this difficulty was that some of the members of the defendant class
destroyed the records needed to make rebates to their shippers. The
court held that the defendants should not be permitted to use the
destruction of those records to defeat the class action.9" There had
been no justification for the destruction of records by the defendant
class members and that those defendants had, in some cases, destroyed
those records after receiving notice they would be required to
make refunds to the plaintiff and members of the plaintiff class. 95
Furthermore, the district court had, after holding a two-day hearing
on the question, devised a reasonable procedure for ascertaining and
modifying those class members.9 6 Thus, its conclusion in that case that
the defendants' destruction of documents should not be permitted to
defeat the class was completely justified. But in many cases, the rec-
ords needed to establish the identity of members of a class may have
been destroyed through no fault of any party, and it may be difficult
or impossible to reconstruct those records from other sources. In such
93. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp.
714, 724-25 (N.D. Ill. 1968) and Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp
484, 491 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
94. 494 F.2d at 139.
95. Id. at 139 n.24 and accompanying text.
96. The district court's order required the members of the defendant class who had
no records relating to the shippers who had shipped under the applicable tariffs during
the time period covered by the plaintiff's complaint to provide records of shippers who
had shipped under those tariffs for the 18-month period closest to the applicable period.
Although the court does not say so, it is probable that the district court contemplated
giving notice to these shippers, many of whom were likely to have shipped under the
same tariffs during the applicable time period. These shippers could then establish their
right to recover by their own records and testimony, and thus avoid any "fluid class"
recovery problems. See 494 F.2d at 137. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen
111), 494 F.2d 1005 (1973); and Bosches v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D.
I1. 1973).
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a case, the court's inability to determine the membership of the class,
or the persons to whom any recovery should be paid, may well necessi-
tate the denial of class action status.97 The only alternative would be
a fluid class recovery, which the Second Circuit held to be "illegal, in-
admissible as a solution to the manageability problems of class actions
and wholly improper" in Eisen JJJ,98 and which the Seventh Circuit
implied to be of at least questionable propriety in Appleton Electric.9
In Appleton Electric, the court was presented with a case in which
the defendant class members had made every conceivable effort to
thwart the recovery by plaintiffs and their class of rate rebates to which
they were rather clearly entitled. The carrier defendants had ex-
hausted every avenue of review of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's determination that the rates they charged were unfair and that
the shippers whom they had overcharged should be reimbursed. The
Commission's order was judicially reviewed by a federal district court
and the shippers appealed that court's decision to the Supreme Court.
Both the district court and the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's
order. Even then, the carriers failed to pay the rebates which had
been ordered. They were then sued in individual actions by many of
the shippers. They resisted these actions, many of which had been
pending for over three years. A number of the carriers destroyed their
records identifying class members with no apparent justification after
being put on notice that they would be required to rebate overcharges
to them.' 0
In view of the facts before it in the Appleton Electric case, it is
not surprising that the court dealt firmly with the members of the de-
fendant class. But the court will certainly be faced with numerous dif-
ficulties in applying (or reconsidering) many of its unnecessarily broad
statements of class action principles in the future.
DISCOVERY
One issue which has been frequently presented to the district
courts, both in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, is whether parties
97. See, e.g., Turoff v. Union Oil Co. of California, 61 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
98. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. The court in Appleton Electric noted that the district court had avoided certain
"creative innovations" which the Second Circuit had found improper in Eisen III (includ-
ing fluid class recovery) and had "employed only procedures that are clearly proper in
federal class action suits." 494 F.2d at 137.
100. Id. at 128-33.
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opposing class actions should be permitted to engage in discovery from
absent class members and, if they are, what conditions and restrictions
should be placed on that discovery. Several district courts have held
that such discovery should not be permitted,' 0 1 but a number of other
district courts have held that certain types of discovery against class
members should be allowed, 102 although usually subject to restric-
tions. 103  However, this issue has been decided by no court of appeals
other than the Seventh Circuit, which has decided three recent cases
relating to the subject. 04
The cases which allow defendants to take discovery from class
members (or require some affirmative response from class members)
101. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); and
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 5.5 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971). See also, Bisgeier v. Fotomat
Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973) where the court refused to allow interrogatories
to be sent to the class where it concluded that the information requested by them was
irrelevant and that the interrogatories constituted "a tactic to take undue advantage of
the class members or . . . a stratagem to reduce the number of claimants." The court
cited Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971);
and Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460 (D. Utah 1972), in which the
court held that the interrogatories which defendants sought to serve on class members
were "unnecessary and unjustifiably dilatory," but stated that interrogatories could be
served on class members "at an appropriate time and for essential purposes." Id. at 462.
102. Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Ia. 1972) (class mem-
bers required to submit pre-judgment proofs of claim); Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55
F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972) (pre-judgment proofs of claim required); Kom v. Franchard,
50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (pre-judgment proofs of claim); Philadelphia Electric
Co., v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (statements of
intent to prove damages); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D.
Minn. 1968) (verified pre-judgment proofs of claim); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Road-
oils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Ia. 1968) (notices of intent to assert claim); and Har-
ris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966) (statement of claim containing information
regarding reliance and statute of limitations).
103. One restriction which has been placed on discovery from class members is that
the discovery must be reasonable, necessary, and not intended simply to take advantage
of the class members or reduce the number of claimants. See, e.g., Bisgeier v. Fotomat
Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973). A number of courts which have allowed defend-
ants to seek information from class members have refused to dismiss or bar the claims
of those class members or apply other sanctions where the class members failed to com-
ply with the requests for that information. See Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D.
62 (D.D.C. 1972) and Korn v. Franchard, 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). See also unpublished order of Judge Hu-
bert Will in Goodman v. ARi Inc., 73 C 3126 (N.D. Ill. November 11, 1974). But
see Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 59 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Ia. 1972).
104. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974); Apple-
ton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); and
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971). Although
the Tenth Circuit mentioned in Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th
Cir. 1972) that the notice sent to class members pursuant to the order of the district
court had required class members to inform the court of their intention to assert claims,
that court did not specifically deal with the propriety of that notice. Similarly, in Kom
v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit discussed
the effect of the proof of claim forms sent to class members pursuant to an order of
the district court, but did not rule on the propriety of that order.
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give several reasons for doing so. Most of the courts which have re-
quired class members to file either notices of their intent to assert
claims or some kind of pre-judgment proof of claim have emphasized
the desirability of defining the nature, scope and size of the class. 10 5
Others have found the information that could be obtained from the
class through interrogatories or statements of claim to be necessary or
helpful in re-assessing the size of the class, the adequacy of its rep-
resentation and the commonality of the issues before the court, as well
as other factors which would determine whether the case should be
permitted to continue as a class action. 1 6 Some courts have concluded
that such information would provide them with the means to determine
whether subclasses should be either established or eliminated. 10 7  At
least one court has suggested that interrogatories to the class might be
important in defining the scope of the defendants' potential liability in
cases where the parties desire to discuss settlement.10 8  Another court
pointed out that some response from class members who intended to
assert claims would "reduce the trouble and extent of subsequent no-
tices which may be required."' 1 9  Still other courts have indicated that
the information which could be obtained from class members was
necessary to either define the claims of the class members or permit
the defendant to develop its defenses to those claims." 0
105. Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 24 (1972); Arey v. Providence
Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 71 (D.D.C. 1972); Korn v. Franchard, 50 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); and Philadelphia Electric
Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
106. Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 71 (D.D.C. 1972); Korn v. Franchard,
50 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972);
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 459 (E.D. Pa.
1968); and Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 75 (D. Utah 1966).
107. Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. (S.D. Ia. 1972); Arey v. Provi-
dence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 71 (D.D.C. 1972); and Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 73 (D.
Utah 1966).
108. Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also
Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 24, 43 (S.D. Ia. 1973), where the court
stresses the importance of "allowing the parties to assess their claims prior to trial."
109. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 459
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
110. See Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. (S.D. Ia. 1972) (requiring
information regarding reliance and statute of limitations questions in securities fraud
case); Kom v. Franchard, 50 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (information relating to reli-
ance in securities fraud case); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 577
(D. Minn. 1968) (court in antitrust class action provides for proof of claim form
containing information regarding dates and amounts of purchases, defendant from
whom purchases were made, and use to which materials purchased were put); Har-
ris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 74 (D. Utah 1966) (class members in securities fraud case to
provide information regarding the representations on which they relied and the time they
first learned those representations were false). See also Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Road-
oils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Ia. 1968), in which the court found that a notice of
intept to assert A claim was a .matter of "expediency and fairness to the defendants,"
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The cases which have denied defendants the right to seek dis-
covery from class members usually emphasize that, to require class
members to respond to such discovery requests, especially with the
threat of their claims being dismissed or 'barred in the event they do
not respond, is to require those class members to opt into the class,
thus defeating the purpose of the opt-out provisions of revised rule
23(c)(2).'11 As stated by Judge Tone:
The proposed procedure [of serving detailed interrogatories on
class members] challenges the concept which is fundamental to the
effective conduct of class actions under Rule 23(,b)(3). The rule
contemplates that the represented members of the class will benefit
from, and be bound by, the judgment in the action 'without the
burden of actually participating.'11 2
The question of the right of defendants to take discovery from class
members and the proper sanctions for the failure of class members to
respond thereto was first presented to the Seventh Circuit in Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co. 113  In Brennan, the court reviewed
the district court's dismissal with prejudice of class members who failed
to respond to interrogatories to the class and requests to produce docu-
ments after they had received several notices that they were required
to do so.14 The court there held:
It is likely that, at least in securities fraud cases alleging failure to disclose material
facts, proof of reliance from class members will no longer be required. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62
F.R.D. 118, 120-21 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
111. Rule 23(c)(2) (which applies only to class actions maintained under rule
23(b) (3)), provides that:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
112. Opinion of Judge Phillip Tone in Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118, 119
(N.D. Ill. 1973), citing 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1787 (1972).
113. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971).
114. The district court first directed that the orders requiring class members to an-
swer interrogatories and produce documents be sent to class members. Accompanying
these orders was a memorandum from plaintiff's counsel describing the discovery pro-
ceedings and the reason for the interrogatories and requests for documents, mentioning
the deadline for responses thereto, and encouraging each class member to seek the advice
of his own counsel or counsel for the named plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel
sent a reminder to all class members reminding them of the deadline and again encour-
aging them to seek advice from their own or plaintiff's own counsel. After the deadline
expired, plaintiff's counsel again wrote to class members who had not responded urging
them to respond and informing them that their failure to do so would preclude them
from sharing in any possible recovery. Finally, the unresponsive class members were
CLASS ACTIONS
[A]bsent members of a class who receive notice of the pendency
of the class suit may be subjected to the party discovery procedures
permitted under the Federal Rules. Before ordering such dis-
covery, a trial court must be assured that the requested information
is actually needed in preparation for trial and that discovery de-
vices are not used to take unfair advantage of 'absent' class mem-
bers. Moreover adequate notice must be given so that such per-
sons are fully informed of the discovery order and the possible con-
sequences of their noncompliance with it.115
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court indicated that a slightly dif-
ferent criterion than the "actually needed" test should be applied to
determine whether party discovery should be permitted against class
members. It stated that such discovery should be permitted where it
"is necessary or helpful to the proper presentation and correct adjudi-
cation of the . . . suit." 116
The court next discussed the question of the propriety of discovery
against class members in connection with a district court order re-
quiring members of a defendant class to submit verified lists of the
names and addresses of shippers who shipped under certain tariffs. In
this case, Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways,"7 the
court simply remarked: [I]n view of the broad discovery of class
members permitted in this circuit . . . it would indeed be anomalous
to place restrictions on discovery in this refund case.""'
A few months after its decision in Appleton Electric, the court
again was faced with the question which was before it in Brennan. In
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.," 9 Judge Will had given the class the
notice required by rule 23(c)(2) informing class members that if they
did not opt out of the class, they would be included in it. The case
subsequently came before Judge Perry, who ordered that a second no-
tice be sent to class members advising them that they would be ex-
cluded from the class unless they affirmatively requested inclusion.
Judge Perry also dismissed with prejudice those class members who
failed to answer interrogatories or appear for depositions. 20
sent copies of an order to show cause together with a letter warning them that their
claims would be dismissed with prejudice if they did not respond. 450 F.2d at 1002.
115. Id. at 1006.
116. 450 F.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). The court also emphasized that discovery
against class members should not be permitted as a matter of course and that adequate
precautionary measures must be taken to assure that class members are not confused.
117. 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
118. Id. at 138 (citations omitted). The court does not discuss the sanctions which
might be applied if the members of the defendant class fail to respond to the request
for information sought.
119. No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974).
120. Id. at 23-24.
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The court in Clark first held that the second notice sent to class
members was "confusing," an "unsound practice," and contrary to the
express language of rule 23(c) (2) (B) .121 It then held that the dis-
trict court improperly dismissed class members who had failed to an-
swer interrogatories because it had apparently done so without deter-
mining whether the Brennan criteria of necessity and the absence of
a bad faith attempt to diminish class membership had been met.
122
The court reached the same conclusion with respect to class members
who failed to appear for depositions, except that it held that the burden
on the party seeking deposition testimony to show the necessity of such
testimony was even more severe than that imposed on the party seeking
to use interrogatories. 2 '
In view of the restrictions on discovery against class members con-
tained in Judge Swygert's opinions in Brennan and Clark, there seems
to be some question as to the viability of Judge Sprecher's assertion
in Appleton Electric that "broad discovery of class members [is] per-
mitted in this circuit.' 1 24  However, it should be recognized that, de-
spite the court's broad language in Appleton Electric, the discovery
permitted there probably came within all of the restrictions set forth
in Brennan and Clark. The discovery in Appleton Electric was ob-
viously necessary to determine the names of the members of the plain-
tiff class, and the trial court reached the decision to require the mem-
bers of the defendant class to provide the necessary information after
holding two days of hearings on the class action issue during which it
heard testimony from at least seventeen witnesses. 125  Under the cir-
cumstances, it seems apparent that the plaintiff met its burden of show-
ing that such discovery was necessary.
The Brennan, Appleton Electric and Clark decisions, as well as
the district court decision in Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corporation26 justify
several conclusions regarding discovery from class members. First, it
is clear that "party" discovery from absent class members will be al-
121. Id. at 23.
122. Id. at 24. The court also specifically concluded that the information sought
was not necessary. The court found that the information sought could not have been
provided by most class members without technical or legal advice (and was, in fact, the
subject of expert testimony at trial), and that the answers to some of the questions were
already known to defendants. Id.
123. Id. at 24-25.
124. Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 138 (7th
Cir. 1974). Judge Sprecher was also on the panel which decided Clark.
125. Id. at 137-38.
126. 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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lowed in the Seventh Circuit under appropriate circumstances. 27  This
conclusion seems to be consistent with the subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court in Zahn v. International Paper Co.' 8 and American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah'29 in which that Court held that absent class
members must be treated as parties for both jurisdictional purposes and
tolling of applicable statutes of limitations during the time the class ac-
tion determination is being made. Second, non-party discovery will also
be permitted although under severely limited circumstances.13 0  Under
the appropriate circumstances, the courts can impose sanctions for the
failure of class members to comply with discovery orders. 13 1  Third,
it is clear that the district courts must give adequate notice to class
members of discovery orders and the consequences of the failure of
the class members to comply with them. 3 2  Finally, it is apparent that
the party seeking the discovery has the burden of proving that it is
necessary and not intended merely to diminish the size of the class. 3
The court has also set forth a number of criteria which can be
applied in determining whether discovery is necessary, rather than a
tactic to take undue advantage of the class. Brennan suggests that
discovery will not be permitted "solely to determine the identity and
amount of the class members claims."' 34  It also indicates that informa-
tion relating to defenses which could not otherwise be established are
valid subjects of inquiry..'3  The decision in Clark suggests that the
court will not approve interrogatories which require the assistance of
127. Including interrogatories and requests to admit under rules 33 and 34 F.R.C.P.;
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971); and Clark
v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974) at 23-24.
128. 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
129. 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974).
130. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974) at 23-
24.
131. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.
1971).
132. Id. at 1006.
133. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974).
134. 450 F.2d at 1005. See also Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118, 120
(N.D. Ill. 1973). But see id. at 121 where Judge Tone suggests that, "when the parties
desire to discuss settlement . . . the aggregate amount claimed would be an important
factor in the negotiations." Thus, interrogatories with respect to the number of class
members and the amount of their claims might be proper at that time.
135. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir.
1971). See also Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118, 120, discussing the statute
of limitations defense. Another defense for which discovery from the class may often
be necessary is each class member's lack of a claim for the minimum jurisdictional
amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1332 (1970). See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), and Note, Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83
YALE L.J. 602, 621 (1972),
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technical or legal experts, or which request information already known
to the party opposing the class.' 3 6
In the opinion of the authors, the Seventh Circuit has not only
led the courts in other circuits in making law in the area of discovery
against class members, but has done a commendable job of balancing
the two almost completely inconsistent considerations involved. Cer-
tainly, rule 23 contemplates a role for class members which is less ac-
tive than that of named parties, but it must be realized that there is
often information which will be relevant to the claims or defenses of
the party opposing the class which can best (and perhaps only) be ob-
tained from class members. Rule 23 does not require that there be
no individual issues in class actions, but only that common issues pre-
dominate over individual issues. To the extent that there are individ-
ual issues involved in a case, the party opposing the class probably has
a due process right to present evidence relevant to them at trial, and
that evidence may be unobtainable through any method other than dis-
covery from class members. 1 7  Furthermore, under certain circum-
stances, discovery from class members will be necessary to determine
whether or not the prerequisites for a class action have been estab-
lished. 38  It may also be extremely beneficial for parties and the courts
to know the dimensions of the cases in which they are involved to per-
mit meaningful settlement negotiations and to provide some idea of
how to manage the trial of the case (if it is manageable).3 9
Although the Seventh Circuit has apparently recognized some of
these considerations, they should not be underemphasized. The court
must continue to keep in mind the constitutional and statutory rights
which parties might have to disprove the claims of the members of the
class they are opposing, to establish their defenses to those claims, and
to develop the facts necessary for an intelligent decision on the question
of whether the prerequisites of rule 23(a) and (b) have been satisfied.
Although the court must also pay heed to the policies ordained by rule
23, those policies cannot be permitted to take precedence over the
136. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 72-1655 (7th Cir. July 20, 1974).
137. For example, the authors do not know of any cases determining whether a class
member can be compelled to testify at trial when he cannot be served within 100 miles
of the court in which the action is to be tried. See Rule 45(3). In any event, even
if the appearance of a class member could be compelled at trial, as can the appearance
of any other party, it would be much less burdensome for his deposition to be taken.
138. See note 106 supra.
139. See note 150 supra; and Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118, 121
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
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right of parties opposing class actions to adequately prepare their
defense.
APPEALABILITY
Another important issue which has recently been decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is whether orders allowing
or denying class action status are "final decisions" which can be re-
viewed by courts of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.140
Because of the importance of the issue of whether an action can
proceed as a class action,"' litigants have often sought review by the
courts of appeals when that issue is determined adversely to them. In
so doing, they have asserted several different grounds for appellate
jurisdiction. These include: the argument that, at least in cases where
injunctive relief is sought, the denial of class action status constitutes
an order refusing an injunction which is appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1);142 the application for a writ of mandamus under the
All Writs Act; 143 the request for certification of the class actions ques-
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) provides in part:
The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts.
141. The importance of the question of whether an action will be permitted to pro-
ceed as a class action is demonstrated by the Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin case which
was recently before the Supreme Court. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). The named plaintiff
in that case claimed damages of only $70. Id. at 2144. However, he claimed to rep-
resent a class of six million persons. Id. at 2147. If each class member had the same
amount of damages as the plaintiff, the defendants' potential liability to the class would
be $420 million plus costs and attorneys' fees, as opposed to $70 to the plaintiff alone.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970) provides in part that:
(a) The Courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States
refusing . . . injunctions.
Parties have been successful in obtaining review under § 1292(a)(1) of decisions
denying class action status in the following cases: Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st
Cir. 1972); Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Shapiro v.
Bernstein & Co., 386 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1967); Brunson v. Board of Trustee, 311 F.2d
107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963); see also Hackett v. General
Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1972), and Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders
Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COL. L. REV. 1292 (1970). Contra, Songy v.
Coastal Chemical Corp., 469 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1972).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). See Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3rd
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). See also Swindell-Dressler Corp. v.
Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1962). But courts are very reluctant to "second
guess" the district courts in an area in which the district courts are given broad discre-
tion, and usually deny petitions for writs of mandamus in such cases. See Solomon v.
Continental American Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1972); Hackett
v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1972); Weight Watchers of Philadel-
phia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1972); Interpace
Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1971); and Gold Strike Stamp
Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970).
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tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); 144 and the argument that an order
allowing or denying class action status is a final decision under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.- 45
Of all these methods for seeking review of adverse class action
determinations, the method which has engendered the most contro-
versy has been the argument that such a determination is a final deci-
sion within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This controversy has
revolved around the question of whether a class action determination
comes within the "collateral order doctrine" described by the Supreme
Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 4 6  In that case,
the Court held that an order denying the application of a state statute
which required a plaintiff to put up a bond for the defendant's costs
and attorney's fees was appealable under section 1291. The Court
held that the order denying the defendant's motion to require the plain-
tiff to post such a bond was
in that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision
of the statute [section 1291] this practical rather than a technical
construction.147
The question of whether a class action determination is appealable
under the Cohen rule may well depend on whether that determination
allows or denies class action status. Thus, the law which has developed
in these two types of cases will be discussed separately.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides in part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise ap-
pealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing
in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
an appeal.
See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested that this approach might be used
on at least three different occasions in King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.,
479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973); in Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 469 F.2d 14, 15 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972); and in its unpublished orders in Garza
v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., No. 73-1012 (7th Cir. May 18, 1973); Lupia v. Stella
D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., No. 73-1026 (7th Cir. May 18, 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
2639 (1974); and Winokur v. Bell Savings and Loan Association, No. 72-2029 (7th Cir.
May 18, 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2639 (1974).
145. See note 140 supra.
146. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
147. Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
CLASS ACTIONS
Appeals From Orders Denying Class Action Status
The question of whether an order denying a plaintiff the right to
maintain his action as a class action was first presented to a court of
appeals in the Eisen I case.148  In that case the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit said:
Dismissal of the class action in the present case, . . . will irrepar-
ably harm [the plaintiff] and all others similarly situated, for, as
we have already noted, it will for all practical purposes terminate
the litigation. Where the effect of a district court's order, if not
reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be al-
lowed.149
The theory advocated in Eisen 1, which became known as the
"death knell" doctrine, has subsequently been adopted by the Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,1 0 but has been rejected
in both the Third and Seventh Circuits."' When the question was
presented to the Seventh Circuit in King v. Kansas City Southern In-
dustries, Inc.,'52 the court said: "We decline to adopt and accordingly
reject the so-called 'death knell' theory originally enunciated in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin . . . Likewise we do not find the 'collateral
order' doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp .... applicable to
the type of order here involved."'
Unfortunately, the court gave no explanation for its rejection of
the "death knell" theory except that, in doing so, it was following
Hackett v. General Host Corp.,'54 Gerstle v. Continental Airlines,
Inc.,"'5 and its "analogous decision in Jumps v. Leverone. ' 156 But the
Seventh Circuit was obviously not bound by the decision of either the
Third Circuit in Hackett or the Tenth Circuit in Gerstle,15 7 and Jumps
148. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
149. 370 F.2d at 121.
150. See Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1973); Miller v.
Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427, n.3 (5th Cir. 1971); Gosa v. Securities Invest-
ment Co., 449 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971); and Falk v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.,
472 F.2d 142, 143, n.3 (9th Cir. 1972).
151. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1972); and King v.
Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973).
152. 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973).
153. Id. at 1260.
154. 455 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1973).
155. 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972).
156. 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945). 479 F.2d at 1260.
157. Also, the court in Gerstle held the order denying the class action to be inter-
locutory because the district court had specifically invited the plaintiffs to renew their
motion to allow the case to proceed as a class action. 466 F.2d at 1377. Furthermore,
there was no suggestion in Gerstle that the fourteen named plaintiffs who remained after
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hardly constitutes authority for the court's decision. Jumps predates
the Cohen case, from which the "death knell" doctrine evolved, and
contains no argument that the plaintiff's individual cause of action
would, as a practical matter, be terminated by an adverse class deter-
mination. Rather, it holds that the plaintiffs in that case had no stand-
ing to appeal from an order limiting the class because that order did
not affect their individual rights.15
It is likely that the reasons for denying plaintiffs the right to ap-
peal which most influenced the court in King are those which were
described by the Third Circuit in Hackett. In that case, the court em-
phasized that the death knell theory had a discriminatory effect in that
it would not permit appeals by defendants or by plaintiffs who had the
economic ability (or who were personally interested enough) to prose-
cute a lawsuit on their own behalf.15 9 It also pointed out that there
were other means for appeals from adverse class action determinations
including 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 160 and 1292(b),16 ' and, "in isolated
instances [where] arbitrariness creeps in, ... the ultimate remedy of
mandamus."'162
The considerations suggested by Hackett are certainly legitimate,
but it is important for the court (and the district courts) to understand
the full implications of a rule which does not permit an appeal as of
right from an order denying class action status at the time that order
is entered. If an appeal is not allowed until after an adjudication of
the merits of the case, meaningful review may be impossible. For ex-
ample, if the appeals court reverses the denial of class action status
after an adjudication on the merits in favor of the plaintiff, it creates
a "one-way intervention" situation where class members would "benefit
from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the bind-
the denial of the class action could not continue to prosecute the action on their own
behalf.
158. 150 F.2d at 877-78. The plaintiffs, who were restaurant employees, sought to
maintain their action on behalf of the defendants' employees working not only at the
restaurant at which they were employed, but ten other restaurants as well. The court
limited their class to the employees in the restaurant at which the plaintiffs worked.
Even if the Jumps case were on point, it seems doubtful that the court would presently
hold, under rule 23 as amended, that a party purporting to represent a class lacks stand-
ing to argue on appeal that the district court improperly dismissed the class allegations
or limited the class.
159. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621-22 (3rd Cir. 1972).
160. Id. at 622.
161. Id. at 623.
162. Id. at 624.
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ing effect of an unfavorable one.' 63  Similarly, it would be somewhat
anomalous in a case where the class was denied and plaintiff lost on
the merits of his action and appealed both determinations, for the court
of appeals to reverse the class action determination and affirm the
determination on the merits. In such a case, class members would be
invited to join in an action they already lost.
In light of these problems, it would behoove the district courts to
heed the apparent invitation by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit to make liberal use of section 1292(b) with respect to orders
denying class action status. Furthermore, despite the negative implica-
tions, the court of appeals may well have to issue writs of mandamus
in cases where such problems are likely to arise and the district courts
refuse to certify appeals under section 1292 (b).
Appeals From Orders Allowing Class Actions
When the Seventh Circuit decided in King to reject the plain-
tiffs right to appeal from an order denying class action status, it first
noted that it had previously denied the defendant the right to appeal
in the converse situation where a class action had been allowed. The
court said:
In Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, this court
held that the denial of a motion to strike a class action was not an
appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We now hold that the
present order is not appealable under § 1291, necessitating the dis-
missal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 6 4
Actually, the question of whether an order allowing a class action
was a final decision, and thus appealable under section 1291 was not
even before the court in Thill. In that case the New York Stock Ex-
change appealed from an order denying referral of the case to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission under the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine, claiming that that order was a final decision under section
1291.165 As the court in Thill recognized, the exchange did not argue
that the class action aspect of the district court's order was appealable
under section 1291 or the Cohen doctrine, but rather argued that, since
the order allowing the class action was part of the order refusing to
163. See American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 94 S. Ct. 756, 761 (1974),
discussing the undesirability of such a situation.
164. King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir.
1973) (citations omitted).
165. Thill Securities Corp. v. The New York Stock Exchange, 469 F.2d 14, 16 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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refer the case to the SEC, it was reviewable as a matter of "judicial
economy."'6 6  Nevertheless, the court elected to decide the question
which had not been presented to it and to ignore the question of
whether "judicial economy" justified the appeal. The court said: "Al-
though the Exchange relied on 'judicial economy' to justify its argument
for reviewing the issue of the propriety of the class action, we hold that
the denial of the Exchange's motion to strike the class action is not an
appealable order under 29 U.S.C. § 1291."''
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken a position
which is contrary to that taken by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in
Walsh and Thill. After holding that the plaintiff had the right to ap-
peal from the denial of class action status in Eisen 1,168 the Second Cir-
cuit in Eisen H,16 remanded the case to the district court for an evi-
dentiary hearing on the questions of notice, manageability and ade-
quacy of representation. The district court held then that the case
could be maintained as a class action. The defendants appealed from
that decision. In Eisen I1170 the Second Circuit stated its belief that
"the consequences of class action rulings are so serious that these inter-
locutory orders should be made appealable.' 171 It also recognized the
importance of affording "equality of treatment between plaintiffs and
defendants.''7 The court further noted that the Supreme Court in
Cohen spoke of a "practical rather than . . . technical construction"
of section 1291.173 Reviewing the requirements set forth in Cohen for
the application of the collateral order doctrine, the court found that the
order appealed from was clearly separable from the merits of the
case.' 74  The difficult problem was whether the order allowing the
class met Cohen's requirement that the order must "finally determine"
the issue to which it applies.T 5  Rather than meeting this question
head on, the court emphasized the "irreparable harm to a defendant
166. Id.
167. ld. at 17 (citations omitted). In Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th
Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an order allowing an
action to proceed as a class action was not final because rule 23(c)(1) specifically pro-
vided that such an order could "be altered or amended before decision on the merits."
168. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
169. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
170. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
171. Id. at 1007 n.l.
172. ld., citing Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
173. 479 F.2d at 1007 n.1, citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1969).
174. 479 F.2d at 1007 n.1.
175. 337 U.S. at 546.
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in terms of time and money spent in defending a huge class action
when an appellate court may years later decide such an action does
not conform to the requirements of Rule 23' 1 and implied that, as
a practical matter, this irreparable injury made the order allowing the
class a final order.
1 77
When Eisen reached the Supreme Court, that Court said:
At the outset we must decide whether the Court of Appeals in
Eisen III had jurisdiction to review the District Court's orders per-
mitting the suit to proceed as a class action and allocating the cost
of notice. Petitioner contends that it did not. Respondents coun-
ter by asserting two independent bases for appellate jurisdiction:
first, that the orders in question constituted a 'final' decision within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and were therefore appealable as
of right under that section; and second, that the Court of Appeals
in Eisen II expressly retained jurisdiction pending further develop-
ment of a factual record on remand and that consequently no newjurisdictional basis was required for the decision in Eisen III. Be-
cause we agree with the first ground asserted by respondents, we
have no occasion to consider the second. 178
Despite the Court's general introductory language in Eisen IV, it
seems clear that it did not really decide the question of the appeal-
ability of the order allowing the class action. In fact, the Court speci-
fically found "the notice requirements of rule 23 to be dispositive of
petitioner's attempt to maintain the class actions" and thus ruled that
it had "no occasion to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly
resolved the issues of manageability and fluid class recovery, or indeed,
whether those issues were properly before the Court of Appeals under
the theory of retained jurisdiction."' 79
About six weeks before the Supreme Court decided Eisen IV, the
Second Circuit reaffirmed its Eisen III ruling in Herbst v. International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.8 ° However, in so doing, the
court did not even mention the collateral order doctrine of Cohen.
Rather, it emphasized the time, effort and money spent, by both parties
and the courts in dealing with such "gargantuan actions," and con-
cluded that "judicial efficiency" required the appellate review of such
176. 479 F.2d at 1007 n.1.
177. Id. Actually, the Supreme Court in Cohen seems to establish three criteria
for the finality of a collateral order. First, the order must finally determine the issue.
Second, the issue must indeed be collateral to the merits of the case, and third, the order
must be "too important to be denied review." 337 U.S. at 546. The Second Circuit
in Eisen III seems to equate the first of these to the last.
178. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2148-49 (1974).
179. Id. at 2150 n.10.
180. 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974),
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actions before such expenditures were incurred."8"
Despite the fact that the Second Circuit in Herbst emphasized
"judicial efficiency" as a ground for appeal, and did not discuss the
Cohen requirement of finality with which it struggled in Eisen III, it
made a point which could well support its conclusion that an order al-
lowing a class action is a final decision within the meaning of section
1291. It said:
Candor compels us to add that as appellate judges we would be
reluctant to hold that a class action had been improper after the
district court and the parties had expended much time and re-
sources although we might have had serious doubts if we had re-
viewed the question at the inception of the action. 182
As the court in Herbst implies, the right to review an order allow-
ing a class action after that action has already been tried, may be a
right in theory only. For example, it would be extremely difficult for
a court of appeals to justify reversing a district court's determination
that an action was manageable as a class action after the district court
spent months trying it as a class action. Thus, applying the "practical
rather than . . . technical construction" of section 1291 demanded by
the Supreme Court in Cohen,' it may make sense to conclude, at least
under some circumstances, that an order allowing a class action is a
final decision appealable under section 1291 "'
Since Herbst, the Second Circuit seems to have backed off of its
liberal rule allowing appeals from orders approving class actions. In
two cases decided since Herbst, that court has refined and applied its
criteria for allowing appeals from such orders and, in both cases, has
refused to review the orders allowing the class actions. In Kohn v.
Royall, Koegel & Wells,'"5 a case against a law firm alleging employ-
ment discrimination, the Second Circuit held that three issues are
determinative of the question of whether orders allowing class actions
are "final":
1. Whether the class action determination is 'fundamental to the
further conduct of th6 case.'
181. Id. at 1312-13. Although the Court accepted the appeal, it affirmed the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the action could properly be maintained as a class action.
182. Id. at 1313.
183. 377 U.S. at 546.
184. The same rationale would apply to the denial of class action status since the
right to appeal from such an order may also be meaningless after a case has been tried
and has proceeded to a judgment on the merits. See discussion following note 159 supra.
185. 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
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2. Whether review of that order is 'separable from the merits.'
3. Whether that order will cause 'irreparable harm to the defend-
ant in -terms of time and money spent in defending a huge class ac-
tion.' 186
The Second Circuit's application of its three criteria in Kohn and
a subsequent case, General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,' 87 indi-
cate that the question of whether a class action determination is "fun-
damental to the further conduct of the case" will usually depend on
whether it is likely that the plaintiff will continue the action alone if
he is not permitted to pursue it as a class action. The court's opinions
also indicate that whether review of the order allowing a class action
is "separable from the merits" of the case will depend on whether a
determination of the applicability of the prerequisites for a class action
involves a determination of issues going to the merits of the case. The
third criteria, relating to "irreparable harm to the defendant," involves
a determination of the difference in the defendant's cost of defending
the case if it is prosecuted on an individual basis rather than as a class
action.' 8 The court in the General Motors case also rejected the de-
fendant's argument that Eisen IV broadened the circumstances under
which an appeal could be taken from an order allowing a class action,
stating that it found in Eisen IV "a reaffirmation of the exceptional cir-
cumstances required to justify departure from the final judgment
rule."189
The decisions of the Second Circuit in Kohn and General Motors
make one wonder whether that court, which seems to be innundated
with appeals from class action determinations, does not now wish that
it had taken the same approach as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits,
which have left it up to the district courts to certify questions relating
to class action determinations to the courts of appeals under section
1292(b). However, the approach adopted by the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits raises the important question of whether meaningful review of
a class action determination can ever be had if that review is not con-
ducted at the time the determination is made. This question certainly
seems entitled to more thorough consideration by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit than it was given in either King or Thill.
186. Id. at 1098.
187. 501 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974).
188. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir. 1974); General
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1974).
189. 501 F.2d at 646.
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CONCLUSION
Although class actions have been recognized by courts of equity
for centuries, 190 the courts have barely scratched the surface in develop-
ing the law with respect to most of the difficult conceptual and prag-
matic problems raised by them. In recent years, class actions "have
sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the green bay tree,"'' afford-
ing the federal courts the opportunity to deal with the rights of many
small claimants whose claims might otherwise have never been heard.
But with this opportunity comes the responsibility of developing the law
in a way which is consistent with both the limited resources of the fed-
eral court system and the rights of the parties to adequately present
their claims and defenses. Although the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit has made a number of admirable contributions in this area,
it has too frequently decided questions which were not before it and
with respect to which it did not have the benefit of thorough argument.
It has also manifested a tendency to make sweeping statements of
policy-which it will find difficult to apply or discard in the future-
when more limited conclusions would have been sufficient to deal with
the issues before it.
The development of the law relating to class actions is of utmost
importance to the administration of civil justice in the federal court sys-
tem. The role which the federal courts should play in the class action
area is uncertain and a subject of intense controversy. In the future,
it is essential for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to give
the class action questions which come before it the most careful con-
sideration possible on a case by case basis.
190. See, e.g., How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, I Vern. 22, 23 Eng. Rep. 277
(1681); and City of London v. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (1701), af'd,
1 Brown Parl. Cases 516, 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (I.L. 1702).
191. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 111), 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
